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In 2017, the Uluru Statement from the Heart was released during the Uluru First Nations 
Convention. In it, 250 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander delegates made a powerful 
statement endorsing constitutional reform to enshrine an Indigenous voice in Australian 
Parliament and in the Australian Constitution, as well as the establishment of a Makaratta 
Commission to supervise the subsequent legislative change and ‘truth-telling’ that would 
enshrine a First Nations Voice in Australia’s Constitution. While the Uluru Statement from 
the Heart was a culmination of many years of grassroots campaigning and activism, there 
remains dissent over whether constitutional recognition could be as effective as a treaty. 
A treaty, unlike constitutional recognition, is an agreement or settlement that is entered into 
by sovereign states after a process of negotiation and would allow for Indigenous Australians 
to have a legally binding instrument that supports their rights and recognises their culture. 
Unlike constitutional recognition, a treaty would recognise Indigenous Australians as a 
sovereign, and could serve to enact agreements that ‘can see greater self-government rights 
transferred to Aboriginal people without the need for constitutional change’ (Gusser 2017, p. 
9). Further, a treaty would impose sanctions for breaches, as it establishes a relationship 
bound by law and convention as opposed to symbolic dealings. 
 
To consider constitutional reform in Australia, I think that it is important to consider how 
constitutional reform was achieved in other nations, and how successful it has been in 
protecting First Nations people. For instance, in Canada, Part II of their Constitution was 
amended in 1982 under the Constitution Act in order to identify specific existing Indigenous 
rights and treaties, while also allowing for Canada to make laws ‘for the peace, order and 
good government of Canada in relation to Indigenous Canadians’ (Gusser 2017, p.15). 
However, this constitutional reform was only achieved after the Nanfan Treaty had been 
signed, and after wide-scale campaigning and lobbying to international rights (Gusser 2017, 
p. 16). 
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In this instance, constitutional recognition was achieved in part because there had been an 
existing treaty that had supported the recognition of Indigenous Canadian rights. Hence, I 
believe that a treaty and constitutional recognition are not mutually exclusive. Rather, both of 
these models could act in tandem to support the recognition of Indigenous Australians, and in 
turn, provide the recognition that is needed to support Indigenous Australian identity (Taylor 
1992).  
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